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Abstract 
The hope for creating widespread change in social values has endured among conservation 
professionals since early calls by Aldo Leopold for a “Land Ethic”. However, there has been 
little serious attention in conservation to the fields of investigation that address values, how 
they are formed, and how they change. We introduce a social-ecological systems approach in 
which values are seen not just as motivational goals that people hold, but they are also deeply 
embedded in the world around us, in our material culture, collective behaviors, traditions, and 
social institutions. They are important concepts that define and bind groups, organizations, 
and societies. Values have emerged to serve an adaptive role and are typically stable across 
generations. When abrupt change does occur, it is in response to substantial alterations in the 
social-ecological context. Change builds upon prior value structures and does not result in 
complete replacement. Given this understanding of values, we conclude that deliberate efforts 
to orchestrate value shift for conservation are unlikely to be effective. Instead, there is an 
urgent need for research on values with a multi-level and dynamic view that can inform 
innovative conservation strategies for working within existing value structures. This paper 
identifies key questions that will enhance our understanding of the role that values play in 
shaping conservation challenges and improve our ability to manage the human component of 
conservation practice. 
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Introduction 
The conservation sciences document a wide array of devastating ecological effects brought 
about by humans (Pimm et al. 2014). However, what remains perplexing to some 
conservation professionals is societal indifference to these findings. Why do people seem 
unconcerned about the unprecedented loss of biodiversity, and why does society fail to act in 
the face of calamitous predictions? Research provides a rather disconcerting answer to this 
question; a great many people simply do not prioritize the environment as an important 
societal concern compared with other pursuits in their lives (Pew Research Center 2015).   
Social values are the cognitive foundation upon which people’s prioritization is built. 
Values are conceptualized as fundamental, stable human goal structures (Schwartz 2006). 
Lynn White (1967) was one of the first to suggest that Western cultures’ expanding 
ecological disaster emanates from Christian values of mastery over nature. Without a new set 
of values, he predicted, there would be a worsening ecological crisis. Likewise, Jared 
Diamond (2005:433), in his book Collapse, stated: “…[p]erhaps a crux of success or failure 
as a society is to know which core values to hold on to, and which ones to discard and replace 
with new values, when times change”. Schultz and Zelezny (2003) echo this sentiment in 
suggesting that value shift might be the only path to sustainability.  
The value shift argument has permeated the conservation sciences for many years. 
Sand County Almanac presented Aldo Leopold’s (1949) “Land Ethic” that proposed a shift 
away from an orientation of domination over the environment to one in which we are more 
responsible stewards of the land. Recently, Martin et al. (2016) suggest a central task of the 
conservation social sciences is to effect this shift. 
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Although there is an extensive literature in the social sciences that deals with attitude 
and behavior change, research on induced value shift is sparse. Among efforts discussed, 
environmental education (Smyth 2006), government policy (Hoff-Elimari et al. 2014), and 
deliberation (Dietz 2013) have been proposed as vehicles for creating value change. 
Moreover, formal initiatives such as the Common Cause (Crompton 2010) and Great 
Transition (2015) claim value shift as their goal. Nonetheless, most social scientists would 
support the view expressed by Heberlein (2012) that deliberate value shift is improbable. 
How does value shift occur and can we affect it (i.e., the “values fix”)? If not, why? 
Given the profound implications associated with these questions, it is critical to address them 
directly. In the present article, we provide an overview and introduce a multi-level systems 
approach to values that can help guide the formulation of answers to these questions. We rely 
on theory and case studies from the social sciences, concluding that, although value change 
occurs, the idea of a human-engineered shift is untenable. We suggest a path forward for the 
conservation social sciences in light of these conclusions, while acknowledging the need for 
future research to inform innovative conservation strategies that can account for existing 
values as an integral part of the social-ecological context. 
Current Approaches to Applying Values in Conservation 
The term “values” is used across many disciplines to describe a wide variety of concepts (for 
an interdisciplinary illustration in conservation, see Kenter et al. 2015). We use a social 
psychological approach following Rokeach (1973) and Schwartz (1992) in conceptualizing 
values as trans-situational goals and principles that guide human behavior (see Table 1 for 
more detail on values terminology used in this paper). For both individuals and groups, 
values serve as standards for evaluating whether actions, events, and people are desirable or 
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undesirable. Values guide what people attend to, what they perceive, and how they interpret 
and process information. If values change, corresponding behavior change across many 
situations typically follows. Individuals’ values are largely shaped in youth and remain 
relatively stable across their lives (Inglehart 1997).  
The conservation and environmental fields frequently use the values concept as a way 
to understand the foundation of people’s actions and beliefs. Researchers have applied this 
concept to: 
1. Describe the values held by groups of people and link them to resource uses, preferences, 
or benefits desired from ecosystems. Fundamental to this task has been identifying value 
typologies. Some of this research has developed resource-specific value orientations (e.g., 
wildlife value orientations [Manfredo et al. 2016]), while other studies have applied a 
more general typology of human values to conservation. In line with the latter, 
Schwartz’s (1992) frequently used value typology (Table 1) was applied in a recent study 
by Hicks et al. (2015) of 28 coral reef fishing communities in the East Indian Ocean. 
Their work tied desired ecosystem services to the communities’ prevailing values, 
suggesting that an understanding of those values would guide the development of more 
effective conservation initiatives.   
2. Understand the basis of conflict between groups. Social conflict over conservation issues 
is often rooted in differences in values among groups. For example, Manfredo et al. 
(2016) describe two primary value orientations that shape human-wildlife relationships in 
the United States, domination and mutualism. They find that the potential for conflict 
over an array of wildlife-related issues is higher in states where the different value types 
are equally distributed.  
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3. Predict conservation behavior. A resurgence of interest in behavioral prediction in the 
1980s and 1990s resulted in models that integrated values with concepts such as beliefs 
and norms (Stern & Dietz 1994) as well as attitudes and behaviors (Homer & Kahle 
1988). This suggests that conservation practitioners can anticipate behaviors from an 
understanding of people’s values. For example, research using Schwartz’s value typology 
in 14 different countries showed that pro-environmental behavior is positively related to 
self-transcendence and negatively related to self-enhancement values (Schultz & Zelezny 
1999).  
A Systems Approach to Values 
While current conceptual approaches to values have been useful in conservation applications, 
they are not well-suited to answering questions about the malleability and stability of values 
over time. To embrace this broader view, we structure our review in the context of a social-
ecological systems (SES) approach. SES science views humans as an integral part of 
ecosystems, recognizing that humans both impact and depend heavily upon natural 
environments. Moreover, the social and natural systems are multi-level, dynamic, and joined 
through a complex series of feedbacks (Berkes et al. 2003).  
A systems view of values differs from the “static entity” approach common in the values 
literature (Kitayama 2002). The latter suggests values are learned ideas that exist in the minds 
of individuals. In a systems view, values include what goes on in the mind (e.g., our fundamental 
goals, what we believe is true, what is important to us), but they are also intertwined in all that 
is around us. Values are integrated in our verbal and nonverbal symbols, communication 
patterns, daily routines, material culture, social institutions, and the ways we structure and 
relate to our natural and social surroundings. For example, the predominant cultural value 
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orientation that Schwartz (2006) identified in Sweden (emphasizing harmony with the 
environment) would lead people to be far more receptive to conservation initiatives than value 
orientations he identified in Zimbabwe (emphasizing mastery over the environment). These 
two countries differ not just because their inhabitants hold different values, but because those 
values have shaped the two cultural systems in different ways — each with a unique set of 
social institutions, daily practices, and explanations of the surrounding world (Kitayama 2002). 
In adopting a systems view, we embrace the idea that values are goals that we learn 
and can articulate, and are related to an array of behaviors. However, they are not stand-alone 
entities, readily vulnerable to change. Instead, they are deeply entangled in a web of material 
culture, collective behaviors, traditions, and social institutions. In the following sections, we 
explore the embedded nature of values and what we know about how and why they change. 
Specifically, we look at the multi-level, adaptive, and dynamic (although enduring) nature of 
values.  
Values at Multiple Levels of Society 
Just as ecosystems are comprised of individuals, populations, communities, and biomes within a 
set of habitats, values exist within a multi-level social structure that includes individuals, 
groups, organizations, societies, and cultures. Of course, levels are not independent of one 
another. Their interlocking nature is explained in systems theory via the concept of emergence, a 
process wherein higher levels form from the organization and interaction of lower-level 
entities. This is fundamental in self-organization. The emergent groups and values that bind 
them have attributes and causal power that are distinct from the activities of lower-level 
entities (Hodgson 2000). That is, groups are more than the collection of individuals’ attributes 
(Klein & Kozlowski 2000). Group values become idealized concepts that attract and maintain 
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group membership and exert a “downward” influence known as immergence. When individuals 
associate their own identity with a group, they tend to adopt the group’s attitudes and norms 
(Hogg 2006). Depending on their role in and attachment to the group, a person may act on the 
group’s behalf even when that action might conflict with their own personal values and goals 
(Elder-Vass 2010). For example, Cramer et al. (1993) found that U.S. Forest Service (USFS) 
employees felt that the agency prioritized use of National Forests for timber harvest over 
management for recreation and wildlife. Many of these employees, following organizational 
norms and in accordance with their job responsibilities at USFS, took action consistent with that 
prioritization even though it stood in contrast to their own personal beliefs about what the 
agency’s priorities should be (i.e., managing forests for recreation and wildlife over timber).  
The mutual construction and reinforcement of individual and group values in a multi-
level system is evident when one considers a concrete conservation example, presented here 
in the context of bird watching. Peoples’ individual values (a) guide their actions (e.g., 
purchasing birdseed, taking birding trips, donating to non-governmental organizations 
[NGOs], planting gardens to attract certain species); (b) give them an identity in interpersonal 
dealings (e.g., being recognized as a bird expert, a strong environmentalist); and (c) provide a 
motivational basis for group membership and socialization (e.g., belonging to a local birding 
group that shares mutualism values toward wildlife and groups like the Audubon Society, an 
international NGO focused on bird conservation). The Audubon Society, in turn, exerts 
influence back on the individuals who act on its behalf, articulating and demonstrating 
“appropriate” behaviors and attitudes that individuals “should” take. The Society also acts as 
its own entity to exert the power and influence that emanates from the collective by taking 
action at an organizational level (e.g., to advance policy that protects birds and their habitat). 
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Individuals and groups are in dynamic interchange; as new issues arise (e.g., increases in 
raptor deaths from rodenticides), individuals respond (e.g., speaking out against the use of 
rodenticides), and group emergence shapes normative positions (e.g., new policies regarding 
the use of poisons) that immerge or flow down to the broader membership. 
Of course, an individual is a member of many groups within a society. Individuals are 
embedded in groups, groups are embedded in other groups, and it is the within-level and 
cross-level influences that give shape to the overall value system. Societal values cascade 
down through multiple levels of organizations, institutions, and individuals and are reinforced 
and modified through reciprocal processes that emerge upward. Kasser et al. (2007) present a 
hypothesis of the multi-level embeddedness of values, arguing that the American corporate 
capitalist economic system fosters values that lead to disregard for the well-being of the 
environment. Schwartz (2007) provides empirical confirmation of this in 20 countries, 
finding that: (1) at the societal level, nations that have more competitive forms of capitalism 
have cultural value orientations that are focused on self-assertiveness and mastery of human 
and natural resources rather than relating harmoniously; and (2) at the individual level, people 
in competitive capitalist societies attribute more importance to values negatively related to 
environmentalism (achievement, conformity, power) and less to values positively related to 
environmentalism (universalism, self-direction). Values associated with capitalism are 
evident at multiple levels and in the institutions and practices of a society’s economic system.   
In summary, the values we hold are reinforced at multiple levels of social 
organization. To evoke large-scale value change for the sake of conservation would not only 
require change among individuals, but also among the groups, organizations, and societies in 
which those individuals are nested.   
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Values Adapt Humans to Their Surroundings 
Values are the result of human adaptation to different social and environmental contexts. 
Schwartz and Bilsky (1990; Schwartz 1992) contend that individual values arise for the 
purpose of adaptation to one or more basic requirements of the human social being: 
biologically-based needs, social interaction, and group welfare and survival. At the cultural 
level, Inglehart and Welzel (2005:23) argue that, within societies, “values change is an 
evolutionary process in which those values that are best suited to cope with life under given 
existential conditions have a selective advantage”.  
Empirical research illustrates this adaptive nature of values. For example, the mode of 
livelihood is an important factor in shaping values. In a study of Chinese agricultural regions, 
Talhelm et al. (2014) found that values of interdependence and holistic thinking were 
stronger in rice farming regions than in wheat farming regions, where independence was 
emphasized. The prevailing values reflected the need for substantial group collaboration to be 
successful in rice farming but not in wheat farming. Similarly, Uskul et al. (2008) examined 
value differences among fishing, herding, and farming communities in Eastern Turkey. 
Fishing and farming require cooperation among community members, but herding is highly 
solitary. Reflecting their mode of livelihood, farming and fishing communities emphasized 
interdependence values and holistic thinking, whereas herders were more independent and 
analytic.  
Other research has shown how values adapt in response to threats in the natural 
environment. Analyzing 98 regions across the world, Fincher et al. (2008) found a strong 
positive correlation between the historical prevalence of pathogens within a region and 
collectivism (versus individualism) values. The authors argue that collectivism values arose 
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as a buffer against pathogen transmission and the introduction of new diseases by 
discouraging outgroup contact, reducing exposure risk, and encouraging conformity to 
traditions proven less likely to transmit diseases. In a similar manner, Gelfand et al. (2011) 
attributed the “tightness” versus “looseness” of societal cultures to ecological conditions, 
defining tight cultures as those with strong norms and low tolerance for deviance. In a 33-
nation study, they found an association between tightness and conditions of resource scarcity, 
disease, and environmental threats. 
Current approaches also emphasize the co-evolution of genes and culture (Richerson 
& Boyd 2005) and values are effected by that process. Studies comparing identical and non-
identical twins suggest that genetics explain approximately 50% of the variation in interests, 
attitudes, and values (e.g., Waller et al. 1990). Moreover, recent advances reveal the 
importance of epigenetics (genetic expression) to the acquisition of cultural traits (Cole 
2009). To clarify, the proposed genetic effects are not deterministic; genes do not dictate 
values. Instead, heritability is believed to shape the development of traits like values by 
rendering people differentially receptive to aspects of their environment (Kitayama et al. 
2014). Values and other psychological traits emerge within the individual through the 
interaction of the genetically-prepared person and their environment. 
In summary, humans adapt to their social-ecological surroundings in complex ways. It 
would appear that our enduring cognitive structures, including values, are part of that 
adaptive process. The nature of values is rooted in their adaptive function, so the nature of 
value change is likely to reflect an adaptive function as well.  
The Stability of Values and Timescale of Change  
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The ability to accumulate and transmit a large body of knowledge across generations is what 
distinguishes humans from other species. The stability of culture and social values is a result 
of that process. Tomasello (2016:3) asserts that “Cumulative cultural evolution is only 
possible because all individuals of a particular generation mostly learn the same thing from 
their elders, and so this is reliable and stable over time for all individuals”.  He proposes that 
this cross-generational accumulation of knowledge occurs due to a unique human psychology 
in which, very early in life, children learn through precise forms of social imitation. They 
quickly abide by and enforce norms associated with the cultural practices they learn, and their 
learning appears to be driven by the desire for acceptance within the group. From this 
foundation of learning, social values emerge early in life and are a critical part of the culture 
that is stable and sustained across generations.   
Values at higher levels of social aggregation are also resistant to change. The concept 
of “system justification” explains that, even in the event of severe threats to one’s life and 
social stability, people will cling to the prevailing ideology, associated norms, and institutions 
as appropriate and desirable (Jost et al. 2004). Reactions to Hurricane Katrina illustrate this. 
Despite delayed and inadequate government response, phenomena such as victim blaming 
and stereotyping shifted responsibility and provided support for the current government 
system (Napier et al. 2006). A “threat-rigidity” hypothesis similarly explains resistance to 
change at the organizational level. Organizational responses to crises reveal a consistent 
pattern. During crisis, organizations reduce the complexity of their communication, 
emphasize conservation and efficient use of resources, and centralize organizational power 
and influence. This results in rigidity of action (Staw et al. 1981) and puts pressure on 
organizational members to conform (Olsen & Sexton 2009).   
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Considering the complex nature of value formation, it is important that expectations 
or claims of value shift be examined in an appropriate timescale. Value change is an 
intergenerational process, and detection of even rapid value shift would require decades of 
observation. Moreover, values show elasticity. Value priorities may change in the short-term, 
but then revert to their previous state. For example, Ciuk (2015) found increased emphasis on 
social order and decreased emphasis on economic security values immediately following the 
9/11 attacks in the United States. Four years later, however, these value priorities had 
returned to their pre-9/11 structure. In another example, Lӧnnqvist et al. (2013) found that the 
initial change in values of Ingrian Finnish migrants from Russia to Finland reverted back 
toward a pre-migration structure after two years.  
In summary, the processes by which values are formed and sustained make them 
resistant to rapid change. That resistance can be seen not only in individuals but in higher 
levels of the social system such as organizations. Short-term attempts to shift values might 
show some degree of success, but their effects may not be lasting and determinations of 
enduring change would require long-term observation. Despite the stability of values, we 
know that in some cases values do change and, as we explore in the next section, this is 
largely due to considerable alterations in the social-ecological context. 
Value Shift Occurs in Response to Substantial Social-Ecological Change 
Where substantial value shifts have been documented, they are in response to large-scale 
social-ecological change. The type of change required to produce such a shift involves major 
reshaping of life circumstances, which could occur as a result of immigration, warfare, or 
ecological devastation.  
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Kitayama et al. (2010) illustrated the value shift process in explaining the rise of 
independence values in the United States. Independence values emerged as people migrated 
to the western U.S. in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries and confronted harsh social and ecological 
conditions. Given the low densities of settlement, these pioneers had to become increasingly 
self-sufficient. They changed behavioral practices and adapted their theories of how the 
world worked to fit their new surroundings. They adopted new technologies, modified social 
arrangements, and codified what they newly valued in stories and customs. The cultural 
practices and psychological tendencies that emerged as a result of these changes explicitly 
promoted independence values. Through this emergent process, parents transmitted new 
values vertically to children. In this way, independence values emerged, spread, persisted, 
and became a strong causal force within the social-ecological system. 
Modernization is credited with being a significant driver of value shift globally. 
Inglehart (1997) argued that a shift from materialist to post-materialist values began after 
World War II in response to processes of modernization that included increasing wealth, 
education, and urbanization, and the spread of democracy and capitalism. These social-
ecological changes systematically improved the availability of resources. Consequently, 
values concerned with subsistence needs lost importance and values concerned with social 
affiliation and self-actualization gained importance. As part of this fundamental value shift, 
pro-environmental values and associated laws and regulations gained increasing momentum. 
The effect of this modernization-induced value shift is significant for conservation. In 
a positive vein, Franzen and Meyer (2010) found that individuals’ post-materialist values 
predicted pro-environmental attitudes across 26 countries. However, the post-World War II 
economy also saw massive increases in the global production of materials from extractive 
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resource industries (Krausmann et al. 2009) and their transfer from developing to developed 
countries (Wiedmann et al. 2015). Alongside its harmful ecological impacts, modernization 
has also eroded traditional knowledge and disrupted the harmonious cultural-biological 
balance struck by many small-scale societies (Gavin et al. 2015).  
It is important to recognize that value shift proceeds in an incremental, path-
dependent manner. Complete replacement of one set of values by another does not occur. 
Inglehart and Baker (2000) studied value shift in 65 countries over a 20-year period, asking 
whether modernization is causing values to converge toward a homogenized global culture. 
They concluded that change is occurring, but along paths that maintain pre-existing 
differences among cultural groups. A study of conservation values among residents in the 
western U.S. reveals a similar path-dependent pattern of shift that reflects the enduring nature 
of values (Manfredo et al. 2016). Although a shift away from domination values toward 
wildlife is occurring, values identified among descendants of immigrants from various 
countries continue to reflect the cultural orientations in their countries of ancestry.  
In summary, as the cases of emerging post-materialist values and the rise of 
independence values illustrate, value shift occurs gradually in response to changes in social-
ecological surroundings. If these changes are substantial, they produce new adaptive values, 
behaviors, attitudes, and social affiliations.  
The Path Forward: Understanding Values in a Social-Ecological Context 
Taken together, our perspectives point to a complex picture in which values are ideas held in 
the minds of individuals but they are also embedded in the surrounding social-ecological 
context. Values are found at all levels of social structure, with cross-level influences and 
feedbacks among groups, organizations, and societies. They evolve over time, serve to adapt 
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humans to their surroundings, and are shaped by genetic or epigenetic influences. Change is 
slow, path dependent, and occurs in response to other changes in the social-ecological 
surroundings. Behavior change contributes to the value shift process, but feedbacks make that 
change mutually reinforcing. The “values fix” is an alluring and often-discussed proposal for 
achieving biodiversity conservation. Yet our position supports the idea that enduring value 
change is very difficult to achieve (Heberlein 2012). We posit that the conservation social 
sciences will be far more effective by focusing on attitude, norm, and behavior change, 
addressing targeted behaviors and the situations in which they occur (see, for example, 
McKenzie-Mohr 2013). 
We are not, however, suggesting that research on social values in conservation be 
abandoned. Instead, we propose that, in addition to the type of research currently being 
conducted, there are important new directions for values work within a systems framework. 
Examples of key questions for the conservation social sciences include: 
• What are the values of small-scale societies living close to critical biodiversity around 
the globe? What are the characteristics of their economies and social/political 
organizations, and how do these characteristics and values affect key conservation 
concerns such as rates of deforestation, wildlife species loss, etc.? What is the effect 
of modernization and acculturation on these relationships over time? 
• How do contrasting values among groups, organizations, and societies affect the 
ability to collaborate on conservation goals, initiatives, and actions? It will be 
particularly important to look systematically across cultures to enhance understanding 
of these processes. 
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• How do values shape the ability of people to adapt to environmental disasters such as 
drought, climate-induced human migration, food shortages, and rapid loss of 
ecosystem services? 
• What are the values of organizations (both NGOs and governmental) with 
conservation missions? What are their employees’ values and those of affected 
stakeholders? What are the dynamics among these groups, and specifically, how does 
change in function and action occur as a result of value mismatches that may arise in 
this balance? Moreover, are such mismatches a precursor to organizational collapse 
as is suggested by the adaptive cycle (Light et al. 1995)? 
• How do the values of groups and organizations affect the values, attitudes, and 
behaviors of individuals within those entities?  Much of the current research on 
individual thought and behavior emerges from “rational actor” models, which 
emphasize individual control/choice and diminish the role of social groups. This is 
particularly problematic given that so many societies are not individualistic, but 
instead highly group-oriented. 
• How does individual-level change lead to innovation and change at the group and 
societal levels? Whether we are dealing with conservation innovations that involve 
new technology, new behaviors, or new ways of thinking, change begins at the 
individual level and moves up through the multiple layers of society (Geels 2002). 
Values are likely to play an important role in the adoption of innovation, yet this 
remains largely unexplored.  
• Instead of attempting to change values, what innovative ways can we work within 
existing multi-level value structures to introduce changes that affect conservation? An 
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intervention to reduce lion killing among Maasai warriors illustrates this approach 
(Hazzah et al. 2014). At the individual level, Maasai warriors were enlisted in a 
program that substituted lion protection for lion killing. The program was built on 
sustaining the social standing and values of these warriors that were previously 
associated with lion killing. Simultaneously, the program worked with the broader 
community to assure recognition that group values were protected and that social 
prestige indeed followed this transition of warrior behavior. 
• How can a multi-level understanding of values improve the utility of conservation 
action by linking strategies taken at all levels (what Hoare [2015] referred to as 
vertical integration of human-wildlife conflict strategies)? This would include 
coordinating conservation actions taken by societies (e.g., laws, policies, 
enforcement), organizations (e.g., projects, funding, collaborations), communities 
(e.g., empowerment, incentives), and individuals (e.g., education, compensation, 
onsite prevention). 
While the conservation social sciences will struggle to inform deliberate value shift, 
they must pursue ways to induce change within society that will facilitate more effective 
adaptation to social-ecological threats. Focusing on what is achievable is a critical step in 
meeting that challenge. 
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Table 1. Overview of values terminology used in this paper. 
Values Underlying Motivational Goals 
Individual Valuesa  
Self-Transcendence Helpfulness to friends and family (Benevolence)  
Equality, justice, and tolerance for all (Universalism)  
Self-Enhancement Success and ambition (Achievement) 
Control over resources and people (Power) 
Openness to Change Pleasure and sensuous gratification (Hedonism)  
Freedom of thought and action (Self-direction) 
Excitement, novelty, and change (Stimulation) 
Conservation Compliance with social expectations (Conformity) 
Devoutness and humility (Tradition) 
Safety, stability, and order (Security) 
Cultural Valuesb  
Harmony Accepting, preserving nature and society as is 
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Mastery Mastering, changing nature and society; ‘progress’ 
Hierarchy Productivity through hierarchical role distribution   
Egalitarianism Productivity through voluntary cooperation by all 
Embeddedness Promoting group solidarity, goals, and traditions  
Affective Autonomy Cultivating and expressing own individual feelings 
Intellectual 
Autonomy 
Cultivating and expressing own individual ideas 
Wildlife Value 
Orientationsc 
 
Domination View of wildlife that prioritizes human well-being over 
wildlife and treats wildlife in utilitarian terms 
Mutualism View of wildlife as capable of relationships of trust with 
humans and deserving of rights and care 
Independence Valuesd  
Independence Focused attention, oriented towards personal happiness, and 
egocentricity in social relations 
Interdependence Holistic attention, oriented towards social happiness, and 
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other-centric in social relations 
 
a The four higher-order values (e.g., self-transcendence) are comprised of 10 basic individual-
level values (e.g., benevolence). Hedonism has elements of both openness to change and self-
enhancement. For more information, see Schwartz (1992, 2012).  
b Cultural values represent preferred ways of responding to three problems that all societies 
face: 1) regulating the use of human and natural resources (harmony vs. mastery); 2) 
distributing societal power to maximize productivity and coordination (hierarchy vs. 
egalitarianism); and 3) defining optimal relations and boundaries between individuals and 
groups (autonomy vs. embeddedness). For more information, see Schwartz (2006).  
c For more information, see Manfredo et al. (2016).  
d For more information, see Kitayama et al. (2010). 
 
